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After many years of experiencing relatively benign ne-
glect, the language in the U.S Endangered Species Act
(ESA) that deals with risks to a species in a “significant
portion of its range” (SPOIR) has attracted a great deal
of recent attention from legal and biological perspectives
(Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton 2001; Center for Bio-
logical Diversity v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2007;
Vucetich et al. 2006; Nelson et al. 2007; Waples et al.
2007a, 2007b). In the latest commentary on this topic,
D’Elia et al. (2008) make 3 major points: (1) when evalu-
ating such language, it is important to consider relevant
legal decisions, (2) in our recent paper on SPOIR (Waples
et al. 2007a), we ignored this step and consequently the
frameworkwe proposed is legally flawed, and (3) societal
values should be considered along with biological crite-
ria in evaluating the SPOIR language. On the first point,
we believe we are in agreement. Regarding the second
point, although it is true we did not attempt a detailed
evaluation of case law on SPOIR, it is not true that we
ignored the decisions of record. Rather, we considered
these cases and concluded they provide little conclusive
guidance about how to interpret the SPOIR language. We
have discussed the SPOIR language and related court de-
cisions with a number of government and private-sector
lawyers, and we found no strong consensus on their im-
port. As a consequence, and in response to a request
from policy makers within our agency, we sought to de-
velop a biological framework for interpreting the SPOIR
language on the basis of biological principles consistent
with existing case law.
We strongly disagree with the statements by D’Elia et
al. (2008) about the relationship between our proposed
framework and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion regarding the case of the flat-tailed horned lizard
(Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton 2001). In that case
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(p. 9660), the Court summarized the position of the Sec-
retary of the Interior as follows:
The Secretary in her brief interprets the enigmatic phrase
to mean that a species is eligible for protection under the
ESA if it “faces threats in enough key portions of its range
that the entire species is in danger of extinction, or will
be within the foreseeable future.” She therefore assumes
that a species is in danger of extinction in “a significant
portion of its range” only if it is in danger of extinction
everywhere.
Not surprisingly, the Court concluded that this inter-
pretation was arbitrary and capricious because it would
render the phrase “or a significant portion of its range”
entirely superfluous. If something can occur if either a
or b is true, but b = a, then there is only a single choice
and the “or” clause is robbed of any real power. Our
SPOIR framework does not suffer from this flaw because
it is designed to cover situations only when the entire
species is not currently at risk in its entire range. Figure 2
of Waples et al. (2007a) illustrates several situations in
which a listing under our SPOIR framework could oc-
cur; none of these scenarios would allow a listing if the
SPOIR language were omitted from the statute. There-
fore, our framework clearly gives “independent and sep-
arate meaning to the clauses that appear on either side of
the word or” (a criterion proposed by D’Elia et al. 2008).
It appears from D’Elia et al. (2008) that the meaning
of foreseeable future is at the heart of some of their con-
cerns about the legal validity of our framework. Under
the ESA (Sec. 3), a species can be considered threatened
if it is “likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant por-
tion of its range.” Likely and foreseeable are some of
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Figure 1. Hypothetical species with 10 historical
populations and historical range indicated by large
circles, whose status is evaluated at 2 time periods. A
(time 1): Nine populations are in danger of extinction
(black dots) and one is relatively healthy (gray dot). B
(time 2): Species’ status deteriorates as all endangered
populations are extirpated (Xs). However, the lone
remaining population fills the current range (small
circle), so the species might be judged not-at-risk under
a framework (C) that restricts SPOIR considerations
to only the current range.
the nonscientific words that those involved in ESA deter-
minations have struggled to interpret for years. As with
the SPOIR language, these terms are not defined in the
ESA, and the responsible agencies have not developed
any policy on their interpretation. Even those with expe-
rience in ESA implementation can have a wide range of
views of how long the foreseeable future is. In one view,
foreseeable implies a fairly short time because our un-
certainty about future conditions increases rapidly with
the length of time under consideration (e.g., one can-
not even reliably predict the weather more than a few
days ahead). This was the majority view adopted by a
group of scientists within the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) (Demaster et al. 2004)
that reviewed procedures for ESA listing criteria and sug-
gested the following be used as interim guidelines until
formal policy interpretations could be developed: likely
means >50% probability and foreseeable future means
20 years. A contrasting viewpoint is that the foresee-
able future could represent a considerable period of time
because some long-term processes are predictable (and
hence foreseeable) in a general or statistical sense even
if specific detailed predictions are not possible.
Regardless of the range of possible viewpoints, each
ESA listing determination must, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, have a particular time frame over which it eval-
uates extinction risk. Let us call this explicit or implicit
concept of foreseeable future y years (as in Fig. 1 of
Waples et al. 2007a). Our SPOIR framework deals with
situations in which the entire species is not currently
“likely” to become endangered within y years, but some
parts of the range do meet this test. Whatever con-
cept of “foreseeable” is used in the ESA evaluation, our
SPOIR framework is concerned with processes that oc-
cur on a longer time frame; hence, our framework does
provide additional protections that would not be pos-
sible if the SPOIR language were omitted. In contrast,
D’Elia et al. (2008) seem to have an essentially open-
ended and flexible view of what foreseeable future en-
tails, which misses the distinction we make in our SPOIR
framework.
Regarding societal values and SPOIR, it is true that the
ESA (Sec. 2[a][3]) notes that species are of “esthetic, eco-
logical, educational, historical, recreational, and scien-
tific value to the Nation and its people,” and any of these
factors might be used to try to interpret the SPOIR lan-
guage.Whether the agencies chargedwith implementing
the ESA choose to do this is more a legal and policy ques-
tion than a scientific one. Including societal values, either
instead of or in addition to biological criteria, could pro-
vide more flexibility for managers and policy makers in
achieving societal goals. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
that formally incorporating normative considerations into
SPOIR evaluations would not come without some costs.
First, although the societal values cited above might all
be good reasons for conserving biodiversity in general,
they are not necessarily good reasons for deciding which
units to conserve (Waples 1995). Societal values are noto-
riously fickle on time frames of relevance to the processes
that shape biological diversity; furthermore, at any given
point in time diverse and potentially conflicting values
might be held by different segments of society, so reach-
ing a consensus might not be easy.
Second, the SPOIR language occurs in the section of
the ESA that defines threatened and endangered species,
so it is natural to consider how the areas that are currently
at risk might affect viability of the entire species. Extinc-
tion is a biological process; it implies the permanent loss
of the genetic blueprint for creating a certain type of or-
ganism. Therefore, focusing on areas of a species’ range
that are considered important to society but are not real
biological units can impedemeaningful analysis of extinc-
tion risk.
Finally, although we agree with D’Elia et al. (2008) that
adoption of a SPOIR policy by the agencies could be use-
ful, we are curious about their claim that incorporating
societal values into such a policy would make SPOIR eval-
uations more consistent and transparent. Our experience
suggests the opposite would be a more likely outcome.
In particular, whether flexibility in making SPOIR deter-
mination is a good or bad thing can depend on one’s
point of view and on who is implementing the flexibility.
Creative applications of a flexible policy can sometimes
lead to win–win situations, but many recent legal deci-
sions also testify to the potential abuses of flexibility by
regulatory agencies.
Conservation Biology
Volume 22, No. 4, 2008
Waples et al. 1077
In their comment D’Elia et al. (2008) also cite a mem-
orandum regarding interpretation of the SPOIR language
written by the Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the In-
terior (Solicitor’s Opinion; Office of the Solicitor 2007).
This document,whichwas released too late for us to com-
ment on in our original paper (Waples et al. 2007a), stipu-
lates that only the current range of a species is relevant for
SPOIR considerations. It is easy to show through reduc-
tio argumentation that this approach is logically flawed.
Consider the hypothetical example illustrated in Fig. 1.
At time 1, an ESA ‘species’ consists of 10 populations, 9
of which are on the verge of extinction/extirpation while
the tenth is relatively healthy (Fig. 1A). Most frameworks
would probably consider this species to be at risk in a
significant portion of its range. After a (perhaps short) pe-
riod of time, the 9 at-risk populations wink out, leaving a
single remnant population (Fig. 1B). Clearly, the status of
this species has declined from time 1 to time 2, because
extirpation of 90% of its historical populations occurred
during that interval. Under the shifting-baseline frame-
work articulated in the Solicitor’s Opinion, however, the
species can now be considered to be not at risk, because
the sole remaining population occupies most or all of
the current range of the species (Fig. 1C). This process
of periodically recalibrating expectations based on cur-
rent conditions has been identified as a major obstacle
to sound conservation and management of biodiversity
(Pauly 1995; Dayton et al. 1998). In addition, if this ap-
proach were widely adopted it would create incentives
that could work against fundamental goals of the ESA.
For example, regulators might be inclined to delay listing
decisions in the hope that critically endangered popula-
tions would disappear, allowing the current range of the
species to be recalibrated downwards. Worse, vulnerable
populations might become targets for extermination by
those wanting to head off possible ESA listings.
In contrast, in our framework a species’ historical range
is an important reference point for evaluating future vi-
ability. A species might be viable even after substantial
reductions in abundance and/or distribution, but the his-
torical template provides our best guide to conditions
that are conducive to long-term persistence. Therefore,
as a species’ status increasingly departs from the histori-
cal template, the default presumption shifts from “likely
to be viable” to “likely not to be viable”; concurrently, the
burden of proof shifts from requiring evidence that the
species is at risk to requiring evidence that the species
is not at risk. In a situation like that depicted in Fig. 1B,
where a species is reduced to a small fraction of its his-
torical range, compelling arguments would be required
to demonstrate why the species is still viable in its greatly
diminished state.
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